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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appeals No. 940446-CA

vs.

Category No. 15

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S. COLOVICH
WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, DARIN G.
WOOLSTENHULME, JENNIFER MacARHTHUR,
RITA M. KENNEDY and/or U.S.
FOREST SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants/Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is a negligence action brought by Plaintiff for injuries
suffered in a multiple vehicle crash. The four main Defendants to
this action were dismissed by the trial court on summary judgment.
Plaintiff

was

a passenger

in the vehicle

of

Defendant

MacArthur, which went out of control, spun around, and crashed
after John Doe 1 swerved into her lane to avoid an obstruction. It
is believed that Plaintiff then exited, or began to exit Defendant
MacArthur's car.
driver's

MacArthur's car was hit driver's headlight to

headlight

by

Defendant
1

Woolstenhulme

and

Defendant

Woolstenhulme's full size extended cab pickup rotated counterclockwise until it hit another car and came to rest sideways in the
road.

MacArthur's car was then hit again head-on by Hopkins who

saw the hazard, stopped and was hit from behind by Defendant
Colovich at high speed.
Hopkins said he was stopped for a minute or more before being
hit by Colovich, MacArthur said the whole accident sequence was
"instantaneous".
The Trial Judge conceded that these four Defendants were
negligent but granted summary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff and Appellant does not agree with all facts as

stated by various Defendants.
2.

All Defendants rely heavily upon depositions which have

not been published or filed with the trial court.1
3.

The only affidavit or discovery submitted to the Trial

^he record on appeal consists of four files and no
depositions or transcripts. While two motions to publish were made
(see Appendix A) , no ruling was requested with regard to these
motions or made pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration. Also included in Appendix A are the rulings of the
trial court showing that no depositions were ever published. No
deposition transcripts have ever been filed or published in this
case.
2

Judge in connection with these motions was filed by Plaintiff.2
4.

Defendants rely upon no affidavits or filed discovery to

support these motions or their opposition to this appeal.
5.

Since no depositions have been filed, Plaintiff and

Appellant does not have access to all depositions for preparing a
brief, not did the Trial Judge have access to determine uncontested
facts.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
According to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is only appropriate:
Ii
the pleadings, depositions, and
answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together
with
the affidavit,
if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
in a negligence action, the question of liability
question of fact to be determined by the jury.

is a

Silcox v. Skaaas

Alpha Beta, Inc. . 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct App 1991); Hunt v. Hurst.
785 P. 2d 414 (Utah 1990).

It should be noted that the trial court

conceded that the Defendants were negligent in this case, but
decided the case on the issue of proximate cause.
Likewise, the issue of causation presents a question of fact
to be determined by the jury.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Godesky v. provo city. 690 p#2d
2

Appendix B
3

541, 544 (Utah 1984) ,f • . .proximate causation is generally a
matter of fact to be determined by the jury." Watters II, 626 P.2d
457-58. . The Godesky court further went on to state
An intervening negligent act does not automatically
become a superseding cause that relieves the original
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of
others should reasonable be anticipated." (cites omitted)
Godesky, at 545.
[0]ne cannot excuse himself from liability arising from
his negligent acts merely because the later negligence of
another concurs to cause an injury, if the latter act was
a legally foreseeable event.
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co.. 611 P.2d 363, 365-6
(Utah 1980).
Whether under the particular circumstances [Defendant]
should have foreseen that [Defendants] conduct would have
exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this
includes situations where negligent or other wrongful
conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated."
Godesky v. Provo City Corp. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

Harris v.

Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later
negligent of another concurs to cause injury, if the
later act were a foreseeable event.
Jensen, at 458; Harris, at 220.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS' LEGAL AUTHORITY IS NOT APPLICABLE
4

Defendant and Appellee Jennifer MacArthur cites Mitchell v.
Pierson Ent. . 597 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985) for the proposition
that a direct causal connection must be established between the
negligence and the injury.

The Court should note that the victim

in Mitchell was murdered, execution style, while in his hotel room.
There was no evidence of forced entry, nor evidence of how the
perpetrator got into the room. The Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the hotel on the issue of proximate cause.
In this case, there is no question that Plaintiff was in a
position of peril as a direct and proximate result of the negligent
driving of Jennifer MacArthur and John Doe 1, the semi-truck
driver, and that he was injured in the ensuing collision or chain
of collisions.
Defendants MacArthur and John Doe further cite the Court to
Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah
1982) for the same proposition.

In Staheli, the Plaintiff hired

Defendant to store barley pursuant to a contract.

A fire of

unknown origin destroyed the warehouse and part of the stored
grain.

Staheli claimed on appeal that they were entitled to a

presumption that the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
The parties conceded that there was no evidence as to the actual
cause of the fire.
In this case, the cause of the crash is clear.
5

Defendant

MacArthur was driving too fast for existing conditions, speeding,
and failed to exercise proper lookout as established by Plaintiff's
accident

reconstructionist

Greg

DuVal. As

a

result

of that

negligence, there was a crash in which Plaintiff was injured.
Defendants attempt to confuse the Court with the facts of the
accident and the mechanism

of injury suffered by Plaintiff.

However, this case does not turn on the exact mechanism of injury
to Plaintiff.

In fact, Staheli was decided on bailment theories,

where the Plaintiff claimed a presumption of negligence based upon
the right or power of control. The Court found that the bailor did
not have the exclusive right or power of control, as the storage
area was available at all times to Plaintiff as well as Defendant.
The question faced by the Appellate Court was the right to control
the

events

and

conditions

of

storage,

and

whether

it

was

exclusively or even primarily the duty of the bailee.
In Staheli the Court also ruled with regard to the negligence
claims and proximate cause, finding that the Plaintiffs had not
been able to establish the cause of the fire.

In this case,

Plaintiff can establish the cause of the accident which was the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
POINT II
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF INJURY AND CAUSE WAS PROVIDED BY PLAINTIFF
Finally, Defendants place great emphasis on the conclusory
6

statement that a jury would be required to speculate as to the
cause of Plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff specifically alleged

proximate cause in his complaint and no affidavits were filed in
opposition to that averment. Defendants never provided a possible
method of injury other than being impacted in an automobile
accident.
Were the Court to consider depositions which were taken but
not published, a particularly enlightening passage can be found in
the deposition of Dr. Robert J. Jackson, wherein he was examined by
Mr. Zaccheo as follows:
Q.
Dr. Jackson, my name is Mike Zaccheo. .
Judging from what you have been able to see of his right
knee, is there any way you can give us any idea of what
kind of forces, either directly or otherwise may have
produced this type of injury? We know that he was either
struck by a car or pushed by one or something. But I am
curious to know whether this is consistent with an impact
kind of damage or consistent with perhaps being thrust up
in the air and landing wrong, or whatever else might have
taken place.
A.
Actually, the most common mechanism for a
ruptured anterior crucia ligament is a hyper-extension
rotary or rotary-type injury. So you are hit, and the
knee hyper extends and the femoral condial goes back and
ruptures the ligament. That is the most common. There
are some injuries that occur in flexion with a vigorous
flexion, flexion load and torque that can also rupture a
ligament.
Q.
Was there anything else about his condition
that would help you maybe form an opinion as to whether
or not this damage occurred as a result of blunt trauma,
as opposed to, again, being projected into the air and
landing wrong on the knee?
7

A.
Not really. It was an acute injury. I mean,
he had blood in his joint. And so it occurred — I am
sure it occurred at the time of the accident.
The argument that the jury is left to speculate the cause of
injury is simply untrue.

Proof of the exact mechanism has never

been required to prove an injury.

For example, in a fire injury

case, it is not incumbent upon the Plaintiff to establish whether
injuries were sustained as a direct result of fire or as a result
of heat and smoke. In an automobile accident case with injuries to
the neck and back it is not required that a Plaintiff establish
whether he was injured as a result of secondary impact or as a
result of whiplash mechanism.

The injury

arising

from the

negligence is all that is required to establish proximate cause.
This is supported by the quote from Farmers Insurance Exchange and
Jennifer MacArthur's brief at 12, wherein Defendant quotes Joyce v.
M&M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172 (Okla 1983), wherein the Court held:
.The proximate cause of an injury must be the
efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to the injury;. . .
POINT III
••PROXIMATE CAUSE" INCLUDES CONCURRENT AND FORESEEABLE
ACTIONS OF OTHERS
Defendants MacArthur and John Doe continue to attempt to gain
mileage in their proximate cause argument by claiming that the jury
may be left to speculate whether Woolstenhulme or Colovich was
primarily

responsible

for

Plaintiff's
8

injuries.

Although

Defendants have claimed that Plaintiff was injured when he stepped
into the roadway, Clark previously testified "if I had gotten out,
it would have been right there in the safety lane" (Clark, P. 65,
L. 7-8). This, coupled with a claim that MacArthur's negligence
was cut off or came to a rest and that Plaintiff was injured by a
superseding intervening cause is founded upon disputed facts. The
further innuendo that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for
stepping out of the MacArthur automobile raises the question of
liability which is purely a question for the jury and has already
been decided in Plaintiff's favor by the trial judge. As the Utah
Supreme Court stated

in Jensen v. Mtn. States Telephone and

Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980) "One cannot excuse himself
from liability arising from his negligent acts merely because the
later negligence of another concurs to cause an injury, if the
later act was a legally foreseeable event".
It would seem reasonable to presume that another crash or
crash sequence may occur.

Gilbert initially lost control of his

automobile and stalled it in the right hand lane. Kennedy saw the
Gilbert vehicle, attempted an evasive maneuver, lost control of her
vehicle and stalled it in the left hand lane.

Both vehicles had

come to stop prior to MacArthur arriving at the scene and MacArthur
lost control of her vehicle and it stalled partially in the left
hand lane past Gilbert's vehicle but short of Kennedy's vehicle.
9

Kennedy foresaw the danger when she stalled her vehicle and exited
the car and jumped over the guardrail. Woolstenhulme next arrives
on the scene, drives past Gilbert'& vehicle, hits Gilbert, hits
MacArthur head on, and crashes into Kennedy's vehicle.
Hopkins, who was previously driving next to Woolstenhulme, saw
the hazard and slowed to a stop short of the accident scene before
being hit from behind by Colovich traveling at a high rate of speed
who went on to strike the Woolstenhulme truck.

Hopkins hit

MacArthur head on. After this crash sequence, Gilbert, MacArthur
Heather Reeves, and Plaintiff Brad Clark were injured.
Defendant MacArthur and John Doe were negligent, and their
negligence directly lead to the injury of all the occupants of the
MacArthur vehicle. MacArthur testified that the entire occurrence
seemed to happen "instantaneously", and as such her negligence set
in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury.
POINT IV
CONFLICTING OPINIONS OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE JURY
Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiff retained the services
of DuVal Investigations and Accident Reconstruction to determine
the involvement of the various vehicles in this case.

The

preliminary accident investigation is included herewith as Appendix
C to this brief.

(R. 270-273) . Mr. DuVal has filed two affidavits

in opposition to various motions
10

for summary

judgment.

(See

Appendix B and D)
Defendant Woolstenhulme says that he should be granted summary
judgment because Plaintiff does not know how he was injured and
that Mr. DuVal testified in his deposition that Plaintiff was most
likely

hit

by

MacArthur's

vehicle

after

it

was

hit

by

Woolstenhulme's truck or that he was hit by Woolstenhulme's truck,
(brief of Woolstenhulme at 7-8).
Woolstenhulme goes on to try and establish inconsistencies of
the testimony of Mr. DuVal by raising a first affidavit wherein
DuVal said Plaintiff could have been injured after MacArthur's
vehicle was struck head on by Hopkins (R. 251); his deposition
testimony wherein he stated Plaintiff was most likely injured as a
result of the Woolstenhulme truck hitting the MacArthur vehicle but
he may have been injured when MacArthur's vehicle was struck head
on by Hopkins (DuVal depo. P. 58, L. 21 to P. 59, L. 18) and an
affidavit in opposition to these motions wherein he provided that
the most probable mechanism of injury was the sequence of crashes
caused by the Woolstenhulme truck and the second most likely
probability consists of the crash sequence caused by the Colovich
automobile

(R.

631).

Although

Woolstenhulme

claims

an

inconsistency in this testimony, such is not the case. Hopkins was
struck by Colovich at high speed, causing the Hopkins' vehicle to
make head-on contact with the MacArthur vehicle.
11

DuVal believed

Plaintiff to have been struck by the MacArthur vehicle and thrown
over the guardrail.

In any event, the question of inconsistent

findings is a question for the jury.
Plaintiff also retained the services of David Stephens to
render opinions regarding human factors aspects of the accident.
Mr. Stephens reconstructed the accident and came to the conclusion
that Plaintiff was most likely injured as a result of being struck
by Hopkins1 Jeep after it was hit by Colovich's Buick. (Brief of
Woolstenhulme at 9).
Looking at the evidence which has been presented in this case,
there is ample evidence to support a verdict against Woolstenhulme
or Colovich. While Defendants claim there is conflicting testimony
from different witnesses, "it is the exclusive province of the jury
to determine the credibility of the witness, weigh the evidence,
and make findings of fact". Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598, 601
(Utah 1983).

Likewise,

[w]here the evidence is conflicting and the jury is
properly instructed, we do not upset those findings of
fact on appeal except upon a showing of the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, so
clearly preponderating in Appellant's favor that a
reasonable person could not differ on the outcome of the
case.
Id.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Hodges v. Gibson Products
Co^, 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991):
12

We accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support
the verdict rather than contrary inferences that support
the Appellant's version of the facts, even if we might
have judged those inferences differently had we been
deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an
appellate court. When the testimony of the witnesses is
in conflict, we accept the testimony which supports the
jury verdict, unless it is inherently impossible, and
ignore the evidence which does not support the verdict
even if we think it more convincing.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have relied upon smoke
screen and confusion to skew the real issues in this action. There
are significant questions of fact which should preclude the entry
of summary judgment as to any of the Defendants which are party to
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff contends that the individual Defendants must be
looked at individually. Jennifer MacArthur went out of control and
crashed resulting in injuries to herself, and her passengers
Heather Reeves and Bradley Clark.

The injuries seemed to have

occurred in an unbroken continuous sequence of events arising from
the accident. The summary judgment as to Defendants MacArthur and
John Doe 1 should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
There is an admitted conflict in the evidence regarding the
potential

liability

Woolstenhulme.

of

Defendant

Colovich

and

Defendant

Plaintiff had two experts, one of whom thought

Plaintiff was injured primarily by the negligence of Woolstenhulme
13

and one who believed the injuries were caused by the negligence of
Colovich.

It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine

the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence and make
findings of fact.

For these reasons, and others as presented to

this Court, the Court should set aside the grant of summary
judgment as to Defendants Woolstenhulme and Colovich and should
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED AND SIGNED this ^^

day of November, 1994.

^> s.

J$HES G. CLARK
^Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF NAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Robert L. Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
PO BOX 888
Provo UT 84603

Michael P. Zaccheo
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
PO Box 2465
SLC UT 84110-2465
Mark J. Taylor
4021 S 700 E #420
SLC UT 84107
DATED AND SIGNED this '2& day of November, 1994.

15

APPENDIX A

Jw30 lOttjjj'iE
JOY L. CLEGG (A4138)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
William T. Hopkins
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone; (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO PUBLISH THE
DEPOSITION OF BRADLEY M. CLARK

vs.
Civil No. 910400220
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et
al.,

Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.

Defendant William T. Hopkins moves the Court for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
because there are no issues of material fact remaining for
decision and this defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of a law.

This Motion is supported by the accompanying

Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavit of William T.
Hopkins.

c

\2

This defendant further moves the Court to publish the
deposition of the plaintiff Bradley M. Clark.
DATED this (7/J

day of January, 1992.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
JoymJ.

Clegi,

Attorneys for Defendant
William T. Hopkins

FILED
Fourth JU',K;.--; r,is;.'ict Court of

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HfT],
~ '
CARM^sWlfi. Clerk

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

BRADLEY M. CLARK
Plaintiff,

Case Number:

910400220

vs.

RULING

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
et al

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

Defendants•
**********

This matter came before the Court on defendant William T.
Hopkins' motion for summary judgment, which was filed on January
30, 1992.
The Court, having reviewed the motion and being fully advised,
now enters its:
RULING,
The Court denies defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure,

There are genuine issues of material

fact remaining which pertain to this defendant's alleged negligence
and to the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Therefore,
defendant Hopkins is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Since the Court's ruling does not dispose of this matter on the
merits, no oral argument will be held unless counsel can show good
cause therefor within 10 days.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

1.

/ V day of March, 1992.

FILED 1H
» " DISTRICT COURT

WE

^

JOHN M. CHIPMAN, USB NO. 628
HAROLD L. PETERSEN, USB NO. 4644
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Attorneys for Defendant Marcus Gilbert
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
MOTION TO PUBLISH
DEPOSITIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S.
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS,
DAREN G. WOOLSSTENHULME,
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M.
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and
JOHN DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 910400220
JUDGE LYNN DAVIS

Defendants.
Defendant Marcus Gilbert, through counsel, moves the
Court to publish the depositions of Marcus Gilbert, Greg DuVal,
and

David

Stephens,

Copies

of

cited

portions

of

those

depositions are attached herewith.
DATED this

11

day of April, 1993.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY

fendant Gilbert

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

I '

day of April,

1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO PUBLISH
DEPOSITIONS was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
James G. Clark
Attorney for Plaintiff
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Robert L. Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendants Jennifer MacArthur
and Farmers Insurance Exchange
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84606
Richard K. Spratley
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOC.
Attorneys for Defendant Donald S. Colovich
1018-B Atherton Plaza, Suite B202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Michael P. Zaccheo
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Daren G. Woolstenhulme
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Paul M. Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company
9 Exchange Place #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

APPENDIX B

JAMES G. CLARK, USB, #3637
Attorney for Plaintiff
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606-4603
Telephone: (801) 37 5-6092
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL

Plaintiff,
Civil No.

910400220

vs.
Judge:

Lvnn W. Davis

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et
al
Defendant.
/

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Greg DuVal being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That

I

am

an

accident

reconstructionist

hired

by

Plaintiff in the above entitled action.
2.

That my qualifications were previously set out in an

affidavit in opposition to Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary
judgment herein and the same is incorporated herein by this
reference.
3.

That I have qualified as an expert witness in eve£y

division of the Fourth Judicial District Court.
4.

That I interviewed Rita Kennedy, and her information was

helpful.

She did not provide temporal and spacial measurements

which she is capable of providing enabling us to determine with
relative certainty the exact mechanism of Brad Clark's injury.
5.

We have always maintained that it is impossible with the

information

available

Plaintiff's injuries.
probabilities.

to

determine

the

exact

mechanism

of

The best we can do is to come up with

I feel the most probable mechanism of the injuries

was the sequence of crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck.
6.

The second most likely probability consists of the crash

sequence caused by the Colovich automobile.
7.

I can provide with virtual certainty that one or the

other of these events directly caused the collision with Plaintiff.
8.

All Defendants remaining in this case contributed in some

way to the crash events.
9.

That

the

factual

basis

upon

which

I

make

these

determinations are contained in my deposition and prior Affidavits
and attachments filed in this case, and r incorporate them herein
by this reference.
10.

I do not think it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to have

exited the MacArthur vehicle. Plaintiff testified that Gilbert was
in trouble and asking for help.

The occupants of Plaintifffs car

were injured, by a collision with Woolstenhulme, while in the car.
The MacArthur car was not a place of relative safety.
2

Wherefore further affiant saith naught.
DATED AND SIGNED this >' 2~ day of April, 1993

• TDvitu
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/ ^ day of April,

1993.

NOTARY M B £ > I C
Residing at: fo(jW

t

~
OjC

My commission Expires:
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f$'&^'ffi\

ohcrlynn White Fonatfrmaksr
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Prove, Utah tv.fiOG
My Commission Expires
Ff/O'uay 4th, 1995 .
STAT?: OF UTAH
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APPENDIX C

DUVAL

INVESTIGATIONS

AND ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION

July 24,

1990

James Clark
Attorney at Lav
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Re:

Bradley Clark

Dear Mr. Clark:
At your request, I have begun to reconstruct an accident
that occurred on December 10, 1989 on 1-15 near Farmington, Utah.
Bradley Clark was a passenger in a vehicle that was driven by
Jennifer McArthur.
The accident was investigated by the Utah Highway Patrol.
Their case number is 03-89-2512.
I have contacted most parties that were involved in the
accident. The following is a summary of their statements as to
how the accident occurred.
Rita Kennedy
Mrs. Kennedy stated that she was south bound on SR-89. She
had been driving from Ogden to Farmington. The roads had patches
of ice on it. As she neared the accident area, she observed an
orange colored Datsun stopped in the middle of the two south
bound lanes. A person was standing outside the car waiving his
hands.
Rita swerved to the left to avoid the Datsun. As she did
so, she lost control of the vehicle that she was driving. She
continued to the left and her vehicle struck the guardrail
several times. Her vehicle came to rest in the roadway.
Rita exited her vehicle and saw oncoming vehicles. One of
these vehicles was a semi tractor/trailer. She feared that her
vehicle would be struck by these vehicles. She jumped over the
guardrail to the east. She did not see any collision events
after jumping over the guardrail.

PO BOX 784

PROVO

UTAH

84603

(801) 3 7 7 - 1 9 8 8

Rita had been over the guardrail for a few seconds when Brad
Clark came "flying" over the guardrail landing nearby.
Approximately 10-15 seconds later, two men came over the
guardrail to help Brad.
Brad was injured. He had a hand, knee and head injury. He
was disoriented and did not know what happened.
When Rita climbed back over the guardrail, she saw that her
vehicle had been struck by a Chevrolet truck.
Brad Clark
Brad stated he was a passenger in the vehicle driven by
Jennifer McArthur. The vehicle was traveling in the inside south
bound lane on SR-89. There was a semi tractor/trailer
combination to their right and slightly ahead. The semi swerved
to the left cutting off the McArthur vehicle. Jennifer applied
the brakes. Her vehicle began to fishtail. The vehicle hit the
guardrail hard. Brad remembers a male coming over to their
vehicle. This person apologized for his vehicle "stalling" in
the road.
Brad could not remember exiting the McArthur vehicle. He
thought he could remember another vehicle next to the guardrail.
Daren Woolstenhulme
Daren was driving south bound on SR-89. He stopped at a
traffic light which he stated was by a Smith's Food King. There
were other cars stopped at the light. He recalls a maroon Jeep
Cherokee stopped nearby.
When the traffic light turned green, the cars proceed south.
As he neared the accident area he observed the Datsun stopped in
the road. People were standing outside the Datsun. There was a
white station wagon (Kennedy's vehicle) near the guardrail in the
inside lane.
He observed a semi in the outside lane swerve to its left
into the inside lane. The semi cut off what Daren describes as a
red "K" car. His description of the events that he observed
identified this "K" car as the McArthur vehicle.
The McArthur vehicle fish tailed and rotated 180 degrees so
that it was sliding backwards. The McArthur vehicle then struck
the guardrail.
Daren observed one of the males standing near the Datsun to
be out in the middle of the road. Daren braked his truck. While
skidding, Daren struck the person near the Datsun. Daren later
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talked with this person. Daren stated that the person that he
hit had minor leg injuries and met with the other participants in
the accident when the police report was made. The person that
Daren struck would be Marcus Gilbert.
Daren struck a white station wagon (Kennedy's vehicle) and
rotated so that he was nearly broadside in the road.
Daren observed the Jeep Cherokee hit the McArthur vehicle in
a head-on fashion. Daren thought that the Jeep was struck by a
large Buick before striking the McArthur vehicle.
Daren was then struck in the drivers side by a Chevrolet
Sprint driven by Gordon Holbrook. This impact pushed Daren's
truck further south so that it struck the station wagon again.
This impact was with the passenger side of Daren's truck into the
back of the station wagon.
Daren crawled out of the back window and went to the
McArthur vehicle where he asked the girls if they were alright.
He observed that the back window of the McArthur vehicle was
broken out.
Daren then accompanied Mr. Hopkins from the Jeep over the
guardrail where they assisted Rita Kennedy and Brad Clark.
Daren stated that the collision events happened in a very
short time period.
David Adamson
David was traveling south bound behind the Jeep driven by
Mr. Hopkins. David observed the Jeep begin to skid. David
applied his brakes and "clipped" the back of the Jeep. David
stated that he hit the right rear of the Jeep with the left front
of his vehicle. David spun sideways and slid past the cars that
had crashed in front of him. The Buick then collided with the
right rear of David's vehicle.
Don Colovich
Don did not see the events involving the Kennedy vehicle,
the semi, or the McArthur vehicle. Don stated that he collided
with the back of the Jeep and thought that he hit the
Woolstenhulme truck.
Don initially appeared to know a lot about the accident but
after conversing with him for a minute, I found that most of his
knowledge appeared to be hearsay.

Gordon Holbrook
Gordon neared the accident scene and observed the
Woolstenhulme truck in a vertical position in the road. Gordon
applied the brakes and skidded into the drivers side of the
Woolstenhulme truck. Gordon did not have any further knowledge
of how the accident occurred.
William King
William stated that all of the events occurred in front of
him. He could not provide any information about the other
collisions. All the lanes were blocked in front of William.
William collided with the Datsun.
I have included a copy of the letter to William Hopkins. He
may be able to provide additional information that could be of
help.
I feel that there are several key players in this accident.
They are:
Marcus Gilbert
Rita Kennedy
The unknown semi driver
Jennifer McArthur and her passenger Heather Reeves
Daren Woolstenhulme
William Hopkins
David Adamson
Don Colovich
Gordon Holbrook
The above mentioned parties could have some liability or
substantial information that would aid this case. Their
statements may help determine when and how Brad was injured. I
recommend that these parties be deposed. The above mentioned
parties would be able to place the events on a diagram to the
best of their recollection. If their respective insurance
companies have pictures of their vehicles, it would be helpful to
obtain them.
I will make a scale diagram of the area and take photographs
of the area for future use.
I will contact Ellis Ferrell to find out where the McArthur
vehicle is so I can inspect it and take pictures of the damage to
the vehicle.
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JOY L. CLEGG (A4138)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
William T. Hopkins
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM T.
HOPKINS

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et
al. ,

Civil No. 910400220
Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states under oath as follows:
1.

Just before the accident in question, I was traveling

in the right lane, South on U.S. 89, approaching the intersect
ramp leading from U.S. 89 to 1-15 South,

As I came over the top

of the overpass I noticed a vehicle stalled in the right lane.
The stalled car was not moving and was crosswise in the lane. I
moved over into the left lane to avoid the car.

I then noticed a

r n >y

two car accident in the left lane, along the guard rail.

The two

car accident was some distance beyond the stalled car,
2.

At this point, I observed the pick-up truck I was

following apply his brakes and begin to slide, lose control and
collide with another vehicle,

I applied my brakes very

cautiously due to the black ice and came to a complete stop in
the left lane.

I was stopped less than a minute when I was then

struck from behind by another car.
car.

That impact did not move my

Within sixty seconds I was again rear ended, but by a

different vehicle.

That impact pushed my vehicle approximately

35 to 50 feet forward.
DATED this ^/

day of January, 1992.

bJJ&^-Tz^

^522
William T. Hopkins
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

3 /

day of January,

1992.

[)

NOTARY PUBLIC

_

Residing in the St-ate of Utah
NOTAftV PUBUC

My Commission E x p i r e s :
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APPENDIX D

JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for Plaintiff
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606-4603
Telephone: (801) 375-6092
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
HOPKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND/OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE

Plaintiff,
VS.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et.
al.
Defendants.

Civil No. 910400220
Judge: George E. Ballif

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Lt. Greg DuVal, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes

and states as follows:
1.

That I was retained by counsel for the Plaintiff as an

expert witness and as a forensic expert regarding the issues of
accident investigation and reconstruction in the multiple vehicle
automobile crash at issue in this action.
2.

That I am presently employed as a lieutenant with the

Provo City Police Department in Provo, Utah.
3.
DuVal

That since 1985 I have been President of my own company,

Investigations

and

Accident

Reconstruction,

a

private

consulting business.
4.

That

Enforcement

I hold

and

a B.S. Degree

Justice

in Police

Administration

from

Science, Law
Brigham

Young

University, receiving said degree in 1979,
5.

That I have received post-graduate education specifically

associated with accident reconstruction from Utah State Police
Officer's Standard and Training, Northwestern University Traffic
Institute.
member

I have engaged in extensive self study, and I am a

in

good

standing

of

the

Society

of

Accident

Reconstructionistsf s (SOAR).
6.

That in the course of my police work and my private

consulting business I have investigated thousands of automobile
accidents and recostructed hundreds of automobile accidents.
7.

That

I

have

qualified

as

an

expert

accident

reconstructionist on numerous occasions in District and Circuit
Courts for the State of Utah.
8.

I have certified and testified as an expert witness

before every division in the Fourth District Court.
9.

That as an expert in the areas of accident investigation

and reconstruction, I usually and ordinarily rely upon physical
evidence obtained at the scene of the accident, photographs of
damages to the vehicles, statements obtained from the witnesses,
personal

interviews, a review of affidavits, interrogatories,
2

requests for production and depositions in cases.
10.

In this case I have done all of the above.

I have

visited the scene of the incident and I have taken photographs. I
have obtained photographs from the Utah Highway Patrol taken before
any cars were moved from the scene.

I have obtained and reviewed

the police investigative report and witnesses statements contained
therewith.

I have seen witness statements obtained by insurance

adjusters, reviewed the depositions taken in this case and I have
personally conducted interviews with Rita Kennedy, Brad Clark,
Daren Woolstenhulme,
Holbrook.

David Adamson,

Don Colovich,

and Gordon

All interviews were with parties to this case and are

foundational and constitute admissions by parties.
11.

Based upon my review of all the above materials in this

case, and particularly the investigative officer's report and
interviews with Adamson and Colovich, it is my opinion at this time
that the Hopkins vehicle never came to a stop prior to colliding
with the MacArthur vehicle in a head-on fashion.
12.

Based upon the statements of Adamson, Colovich, Hopkins,

the investigating police officer and particularly the photographs
taken by the Utah Highway Patrol before any of the vehicles had
been moved, Defendant Hopkins vehicle crashed in to MacArthur's
vehicle in a head-on fashion.
13.

Based upon the information I have available at this time,
3

it is my opinion that the incident did not happen as provided in
Hopkins1

affidavit.

That

is inconsistent

with

the physical

evidence in this case and with the statements which have been
provided.
14.

The evidence provided by Hopkins and the Utah Highway

Patrol photographs indicate that Hopkins made contact with at least
three cars including MacArthur.
15.

Based upon my investigation and review of all materials

in this case, it is my opinion that Defendant Hopkins was one of
the prime players in this accident. There is insufficient evidence
at this time to rule out liability on Hopkins, and in fact there
appears to be some liability on him.
16.

It is my opinion that there are limited number of ways in

which Brad Clark could have been injured in this accident.

One of

the most likely possibilities, to be established through further
discovery, is that Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle
after MacArthur was struck head-on by Hopkins.
17.

In my interview with Defendant Adamson he told me that

he was following Hopkins on the roadway, Hopkins began to break and
slide sideways and Defendant Adamson's vehicle made contact with
Hopkins1 vehicle.

As Adamson1s vehicle spun around he saw the

Hopkins vehicle make head on contact with the MacArthur vehicle,
18.

It is my opinion that Hopkins1 attempt to stop in the
4

middle of the freeway on-ramp may have been negligent and caused
the collision with MacArthur's car.
19.

Defendant Colovich told me in his interview that he

collided with the back of the Hopkins' vehicle.

While this is

consistent with Hopkins' claim that he was struck twice from
behind, it is inconsistent that the collision took place over an
approximate two minute period as Hopkins claims.
20.

Further, Rita Kennedy related in her interview that she

saw the semi and the MacArthur car approaching and jumped over the
guard rail.

Rita had been over the guard rail for a few seconds

when Brad Clark came flying over the guard rail landing nearby.
Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later two men came over the
guard rail to help Brad.

Daren Woolstenhulme said that was he and

Mr. Hopkins (from the jeep).
21.

I have not been able to interview Mr. Hopkins, he has not

provided a statement, photographs, or a deposition in this case.
In

the

absence

of

obtaining

information

from

Hopkins,

Woolstenhulme, Colovich, and Gilbert, I am unable to exclude
Defendant Hopkins either as a negligent party or as a cause of the
injury suffered by Brad Clark in this case.
For further affiant saith not.
DATED AND SIGNED this /*

day of February, 1992.

Lt. Gre^-DuVal
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